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Woe Unto You, Judges: or How Reading Frankfurter and
Greene, The Labor Injunction, Ruined Me as a Labour
Lawyer and Made Me as an Academic
HARRY ARTHURS*
This article is a contribution to the occasional series dealing with a
major book that influenced the author. Previous contributors include
Stewart Macaulay, John Griffith, William Twining, Carol Harlow, and
Geoffrey Bindman.
Here is how I responded to the Editor's invitation to write 'a semi-
autobiographical piece reflecting on a book that was important to [me]':
I'm inclined to write about Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction, an
early realist/empiricist muckraking classic.., which led to a public outcry and
some important law reforms, caused the scales to fall from the eyes of many
who harboured illusions about judicial neutrality, and helped put labour law on
the map as the juristic equivalent of the Spanish Civil War - all of which
appealed to my romantic sensibilities and (then) rebellious nature ...
That is the whole story, truly; all that follows is commentary.
I arrived at the Faculty of Law of the University of Toronto in 1955, a
student with a middling education, good grades, left-ish genes and a
determination - formed at age four, unexamined thereafter - to become a
lawyer. What did it mean to become a lawyer in Canada in the 1950s?
Ontario, the largest and richest province, had a very odd view of the matter.
Up to 1949, the Law Society of Upper Canada - the profession's governing
body - had maintained its monopoly over legal education. It operated its own
law school at Osgoode Hall, an Inns-of-Court-like edifice which also housed
the Law Society and the superior courts. Students attended only two classes a
day, and spent the rest of their time working in a law office. Standards for
admission and graduation were low; formal instruction was patchy; classes
were large; the curriculum was limited; practitioners taught most courses;
and student intellectual life was impoverished. However, the school's
minuscule full-time faculty - the dean and three or four lecturers - was both
very able and committed to change. As their predecessors had done sixty
* Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto ON M3J 1P3, Canada
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years earlier,' when the law school was founded in 1889, they sought
inspiration in the American model of legal education, rather than the British
(four faculty members had attended Harvard Law School). They tried to
overcome the stultifying effect of set-piece lectures to large classes by
introducing America's distinctive contribution to pedagogy, the case
method, and to diminish the numbing effects of British and colonial
formalism by assigning a few American cases and articles. But most
importantly, they pressed for the introduction of a three year, full-time post-
graduate programme of studies, also an American innovation, which by then
had become standard in most Canadian provinces. The Benchers of the Law
Society were not amused; they resolved to retain a part-time programme, and
to continue admitting some students immediately following their graduation
from high school. The faculty's reforms and restructuring proposals were
2unceremoniously rejected.
A ten minute stroll from Osgoode Hall sat the University of Toronto. In
January, 1949 the entire full-time faculty of Osgoode Hall resigned in protest
at the profession's heavy-handed and reactionary regime, and in March took
that stroll to the University, to join its re-organized School of Law, which had
begun life as an appendage of the Department of Political Economy. In its new
incarnation the School of Law (later renamed a Faculty) adopted the three-
year post-graduate curriculum, expanded to eight or nine full-time members
(thus becoming the largest law faculty in the country), practised case-method
pedagogy to its heart's content, and developed its own distinctive intellectual
ethos with predictable American influences. The ten minute stroll thus became
the mythic Long March of Canadian legal education. The revolution it
launched succeeded in all respects save one: despite the clear academic
superiority of the Toronto programme, the Law Society required Toronto
graduates to spend an additional year at Osgoode Hall before being called to
the bar. Those of us who enrolled at Toronto therefore did so out of conviction,
and at some personal cost. Throughout the 1950s, the Toronto faculty fought
for equal treatment of its graduates and finally in 1957, just in time for my
graduation in 1958, it succeeded.3 Osgoode Hall Law School adopted the
Toronto model, several new law schools were established in the province, and
legal education in Ontario joined the North American mainstream.4
1 B. Bucknall, C. Baldwin, and J. Lakin, 'Pedants, Practitioners and Prophets: Legal
Education at Osgoode Hall to 1957' (1968) 6 Osgoode Hall Law J. 137.
2 In fact, criticism from the profession, the press and the public soon forced the Law
Society to retreat, and to adopt a mixed full- and part-time programme. See id. and C.
Kyer and J. Bickenbach, The Fiercest Debate: Cecil A. Wright, the Benchers and
Legal Education in Ontario 1923-1957 (1987).
3 J. Arnup, 'The 1957 Breakthrough' (1982) Law Society Gazette 18.
4 Ironically, a subsequent attempt was made to merge the two law schools, but in the
end, the Osgoode Hall Law School migrated to York University. See H. Arthurs, 'The
Affiliation of Osgoode Hall Law School with York University' (1967) 17 University
of Toronto Law J. 194.
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All of this serves to explain that I was a law student during one of the
most dramatic episodes in the history of Canadian legal education, at a
crucial juncture in the debate over whether law would become a 'normal'
university discipline, free to respond to new ideas and influences, to
experiment with new pedagogies and programmes, to transform not just
academic instruction in law but our understanding of law's intellectual
premises and social effects and, ultimately, the practice, administration and
content of law.
Or so it seemed at the time. In retrospect, things were perhaps a little less
dramatic than we thought they were. The Toronto faculty were in fact
committed not so much to transforming legal education, scholarship, and
practise as to improving them. At this they worked very hard indeed. Faculty
members edited Canada's most significant series of law reports and one of its
most prestigious legal periodicals, the University of Toronto Law Journal.
They wrote articles, case-notes, commentaries, and continuing education
lectures for the profession and edited casebooks for their courses, which
slowly proliferated and diversified. And of course they campaigned for
recognition of their law school and acceptance of their vision of legal
education. These preoccupations left the Toronto professoriate - and a
handful of like-minded colleagues across the country - with little time for
other forms of scholarship. With few exceptions, neither they, nor their
predecessors, nor other Canadian legal academics, produced much in the
way of empirical studies, theoretical work, scholarly monographs or
magisterial treatises. Too few people were trying to do too much, too
quickly, in too hostile an environment.5
Nonetheless, ideas did matter to me and my fellow law students at
Toronto. If we did not quite know what we believed in, we certainly knew
what we rejected: the 'trade school' approach to legal education at Osgoode
Hall; the profession's black letter, formalistic approach to law; judicial
conservatism, and arid conceptualism; law's wilful ignorance of social
reality and indifference to the 'needs of society'. My personal list of phobias
was, perhaps, a little longer than most. Early on, I somehow began to feel
that there was something odd about the judgments I was reading every day
for class. The inexorable logic of the law which ought to have led to one
outcome suddenly wandered off in the direction of another. Or that same
logic, pursued rigorously, produced results which seemed contrary to social
justice and, sometimes, to common sense. As time went on, I occasionally
sensed that judges saw things in light of distinctive professional values and
perspectives, had personal ideologies and political agendas, and that these -
not logic, not legal rules, not social justice - tended to shape decisions. By
5 In 1951, when the Canadian Association of Law Teachers was founded, there were
fewer than fifty full-time legal academics in the country. A decade later, on the
threshold of the great expansion of law schools in the 1960s, that number had barely
reached one hundred.
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the time I reached my third and final year, this intuition had hardened and
broadened to the point where whole bodies of law seemed to me as suspect
as individual judgments. While I could never have articulated this position in
the language of legal theory, in retrospect I had clearly become a vulgar or
unsophisticated legal realist.
Still, however intuitive, inarticulate, vulgar or unsophisticated I may have
been, at least I was ready for Labour Law, the most highly politicized subject
on the curriculum, the subject for which I was genetically programmed, the
subject which I most looked forward to studying. Labour Law was taught by
Bora Laskin - a family acquaintance, with Masters degrees from Toronto
and Harvard and a veteran of the 1949 Long March from Osgoode Hall to
Toronto. By the mid-1950s, Laskin enjoyed unwarranted notoriety as an
intellectual and political radical, which rather endeared him to me, and a
more appropriate reputation as a pre-eminent architect of Canadian labour
law through his contributions as a commentator, critic, pedagogue, policy
advisor, and arbitrator. 6 (Though no one could have predicted it then, Laskin
was to become Chief Justice of Canada - the first Jew and the first academic
to hold that office.)
7
Laskin, however, was not a full-blooded legal realist like, say, Frank or
Llewellyn, 8 much less an iconoclast in the style of Rodell. 9 Rather, he has
been described as a 'functionalist', an 'institutionalist', an adherent of the
earlier school of sociological jurisprudence propounded by Pound, preached
by Justices Holmes and Cardozo, and - importantly for present purposes -
applied to scholarship by Professor (later Justice) Frankfurter. 10 Unlike the
more robust realists, Laskin continued to believe that the common law could
to some extent 'work itself pure', that principled and imaginative
adjudication could produce appropriate social outcomes, especially if
assisted by constructive academic criticism. However, he also believed that
the legislature, not the courts, should translate major shifts in social relations
or public policy into new legal rules and processes, and that courts should
defer to legislative choices.
Finally, Laskin appears to have thought that innovative approaches to law
would be more easily accepted if they did not break radically with
6 See W.L. Hunter, 'Bora Laskin and labour law: The formative years' (1984) Supreme
Court Law Rev. 431; D. Beatty and B. Langille, 'Bora Laskin and Labour Law: From
Vision to Legacy' (1985) 35 University of Toronto Law J. 672.
7 I happily record for posterity that in 1978, in a conversation with me, Lord Denning
expressed great amusement at Laskin's appointment. 'What can a law professor know
about being a judge?' he said, or words to that effect.
8 For a readable, recent account of the American realist movement, see W. Twining,
'Talk about Realism' in The Great Juristic Bazaar (2002).
9 Fred Rodell, a leading legal realist, seemed to me an iconoclast at the time; now I
recognize him as merely a fellow curmudgeon. My title represents a nostalgic homage
to his notorious book, Woe Unto You, Lawyers (1939).
10 D. Rraume, 'The Judicial Philosophy of Bora Laskin' (1985) 35 University of
Toronto Law J. 438.
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established traditions, if they operated within the deep structures of legal
thought, culture, and institutions. He therefore expressed his scholarly views
in the language of legal authority and principle, carefully crafted and
formally respectful, though occasionally ironic or even sarcastic. (He was
somewhat more free-wheeling in class discussion: his phrase 'penetrating
glimpse into the obvious' lingers in my mind.) Nowhere - except in
Canada's claustrophobic, outpost-of-empire legal culture - could Laskin's
views or his style be characterized as avant garde. Nor would he have
wanted them to be. Laskin was also a leading scholar in the mainstream
fields of property and constitutional law. The former, and to some extent
even the latter, would have given him a significant intellectual investment in
discourses which would be familiar to lawyers of a more conventional bent.
Second, he was doing foundational work in the entirely new discipline of
labour law, a subject still considered faintly disreputable in the mid-1950s.
Moderation in aid of the long-term project of improving the legal rules of
industrial relations would be altogether understandable. Third, since black-
letter, formalist analysis dominated Canadian legal-academic and especially
legal-professional discourse, and since the practising bar was quite
suspicious of academics in general and United States-trained academics in
particular, any scholar might have been tempted to opt for understatement,
just to get a fair hearing. Finally, Laskin would surely have been concerned
not to do anything which might unnecessarily jeopardize the credibility of
the new Toronto law faculty, in which he and his colleagues were so heavily
invested.
However, these explanations come to me only with hindsight. At the time,
I would not have questioned the view - held by admirers and detractors alike
- that Laskin's was a radical critique of the conventional wisdom. Nor would
I have understood that I myself was already some distance down the road to
a more truly radical critique (a claim my own students, successors and
assigns will no doubt deconstruct in due course). Frankfurter and Greene's
book, The Labor Injunction, launched me down that road.
How did I come to read The Labor Injunction? I recently disinterred
Laskin's Labour Law casebook from the 1950s and reviewed my notes from
his class, the only notes I have kept over all these years. There was a little
more contextual material than I had recalled, a suggestion that Laskin after
all was something of a closet realist, at least in the area of labour law.
However, almost everything we were assigned to read for class was
conventional legal material - decisions and statutes - and class discussion
consisted largely of exegetical analysis of legal doctrines and rules, with an
occasional aside regarding industrial relations realities, the need for
legislation, and the virtues of expert administrative tribunals. Still, there it
was, in bold letters in the syllabus, starred and underlined in red in my notes:
Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction. Laskin's treatment of the
book must have been rather cursory and my notes on it amount to only a few
lines. Nonetheless, it evidently made an impression on me.
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And rightly so: The Labour Injunction was a profoundly important book.
Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene dedicated their book to Mr. Justice
Brandeis 'for whom law is not a system of artificial reason, but the
application of ethical ideals, with freedom at its core'. They sought to
demonstrate that anti-unionism, not 'freedom', was at the 'core' of the law
governing industrial conflict, that the law in this area was a system precisely
of 'artificial reason', not of 'ethical ideals'. The egregious use of labour
injunctions, they claimed, amounted to 'government by injunction', to 'the
expansion of a simple judicial device to an enveloping code of prohibited
conduct, absorbing en masse executive and police functions and affecting the
livelihood, and even lives, of multitudes'.' Their description of the abuses
associated with the labour injunction had been anticipated by previous
studies but they documented these abuses so thoroughly that they could no
longer be ignored.
The strategy adopted by Frankfurter and Greene - uncontroversial today,
but unusual in 1930 - was to write a socio-legal history. They collected and
analysed all reported and unreported cases involving labour injunctions in
the federal courts and in the state courts of Massachusetts and New York;
they identified abuses of both procedure and substantive law; they recorded
editorial, political, and union reactions to these abuses; they marshalled the
critiques of scholars and legislative reformers; they showed how injunctions
shifted power from unions to employers; and they evaluated their use
according to well-accepted notions of due process and judicial propriety.
Their case was irresistible. Within two years, Congress enacted the Norris-
LaGuardia Act of 1932, which addressed most of the abuses they had
exposed. 12
This was pretty heady stuff for a law student with progressive sympathies
and a legal realist's inclinations: systemic bias and judicial misbehaviour
exposed! hoist with their own petard of legal logic, rules and values! a
pernicious travesty of justice demolished! a whole legal institution
transformed! labour unions liberated from unfair legal restrictions! by a
law professor who became a judge of the United States Supreme Court!
The Labor Injunction, I suspect, had another, quite different, significance
for me. Frankfurter - its lead author - was a Jew and a progressive
11 p. 200.
12 29 USC 101, 47 Stat. 70. Frankfurter and Greene included as Appendix IX to their
book draft legislation which had been proposed in 1927 by Senator Shipstead, and
submitted in amended form by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. This draft
legislation was never enacted, but obviously served as a template for the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.
13 I have been unable to discover much about Nathan Greene, Frankfurter's co-author.
Greene was born in 1902; like Frankfurter he had been an undergraduate at CCNY
and studied law at Harvard. He was called to the bar in 1926 and received his
doctorate in law (also from Harvard) in 1929. He practised law in New York until the
1960s, and was ranked highly by Martindale-Hubbell. I am indebted to John Schlegel
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academic, just like my teacher and role model, Laskin.14 As a Harvard
professor, he pioneered scholarship in the fields of administrative law and
regulation, pleaded the cause of Sacco and Vanzetti, and helped to conceive
and implement Roosevelt's New Deal. As a member of the revered Warren
Court, he was one of the authors of Brown v. Board of Education,' 5 decided
just a year before I entered law school. For all of these reasons, he was
something of an iconic figure for a progressive Canadian law student who
fantasized about building a New Jerusalem in our white and frigid land.
Thus, The Labor Injunction spoke to me not just intellectually but politically
and personally.
Today, I might react differently. I might be asking some realist (not to say
revisionist) questions: were Frankfurter and Greene pushing against a door
already opened by previous critics? Did the publication of their book lead to
the enactment of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, or did the legislation result from
subsequent political and social developments? Did the Act actually succeed
in remedying the abuses at which it was aimed? I might be troubled by the
historical judgement of critical legal scholars who have come to regard the
New Deal labour reforms (and their Canadian transplants) with something
less than unbridled enthusiasm. 16 And of course, I might have second
thoughts about Frankfurter himself, it being widely asserted today that when
he moved on from being regarded as a radical, even dangerous, figure, to
certifiable respectability as a Supreme Court justice, he also moved to
outright conservatism and disavowal of his own progressive principles.
17
Those are questions for now. Then what counted were Frankfurter's
reputation, the sheer audacity of the book, and its dazzling sequel in
reforming legislation.
The year after my introduction to labour law with Laskin, I went off to do
an LLM at Harvard - where The Labor Injunction had been written - with
for the suggestion that Greene practised labour law, but so far have been unable to
document this fact. He does not appear to have published anything subsequent to The
Labor Injunction.
14 Laskin studied Administrative Law with Frankfurter at Harvard in 1937 and, quite
likely, identified closely with him as well. (I am indebted to Philip Girard, who is
writing a biography of Laskin, for this information.)
15 347 U.S. 483.
16 See, for example, K. Klare, 'Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the
Origins of Modem Legal Consciousness' (1978) 62 Minnesota Law Rev. 265; K. Van
Wenzel Stone, 'The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law' (1981) 90 Yale Law
J. 1517; J. Atleson, Values and Assumptions in American Labor Law (1983); J. Fudge
and H. Glasbeek, 'The Legacy of PC 1003' ((1996) 3 Cnd. Labour and Employment
Law J. 357; J. Fudge and E. Tucker, Labour Before the Law: The Regulation of
Workers' Collective Action in Canada, 1900-1948 (2001).
17 Early, sympathetic biographies include: H.S. Thomas, Felix Frankfurter: Scholar on
the Bench (1960); L. Baker, Felix Frankfurter (1969). Recent critical biographies
include: H.H. Hirsch, The Enigma of Felix Frankfurter (1981); M.E. Parrish, Felix
Frankfurter and his Times: The Reform Years (1982); M.I. Urofsky, Felix
Frankfurter: Judicial Restraint and Individual Liberties (1991).
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Archibald Cox (then a leading labour scholar, later famous as President
Kennedy's Solicitor General, and as the Watergate Special Prosecutor who
was fired by President Nixon) and Derek Bok (then in his first year of
teaching, later Dean of Harvard Law School and President of Harvard
University). By today's standards, perhaps, neither Cox nor Bok exhibited a
particularly radical approach to law. But each of them built his course around
real-life issues; mounted a robust, external critique of legal doctrine; and
comfortably drew on a wide range of socio-legal materials. Some months
before completing my LLM, I returned to Toronto and visited Laskin. In an
extremely kind and flattering gesture, he invited me to talk to his current
labour students about how different it was to study the subject at Harvard. To
my everlasting embarrassment - I still blush to tell the story - I regaled the
class with a vivid contrast between the two experiences, emphasizing how
much more extensively and easily American scholars, and even judges,
integrated industrial relations, societal and jurisprudential issues with
technical legal analysis.
Back at Harvard, I settled down to work on a mini-thesis under Cox's
nominal supervision, but with Bok providing most of the encouragement and
feedback. Predictably, I chose the industrial torts as my subject, castigated
the failure of Canadian judges to understand and respond to the labour
relations and political context of strikes and picketing, and prefaced my work
with an epigraph from Frankfurter and Greene. In revised form, the mini-
thesis became the first article I ever published, 18 and it launched me on my
academic career. First, however, I spent fifteen months as an articled student
in a union-side labour law firm, 19 where I got to know the labour injunction
first hand. Nothing I saw caused me to recant anything I said in my article, or
to question anything in The Labor Injunction. On the contrary, my exposure
to the labour injunction in practice confirmed all my worst fears: judges who
made clear their distaste for unions and their tactics; procedural rules
patently designed to deny unions a fair hearing; the egregious use of ex parte
and other interlocutory proceedings so that employers could speedily
dismantle picket lines and destroy the morale of strikers; questionable
findings of fact based on pro forma affidavits in elegant legal language
sworn by deponents who spoke little or no English; on one famous occasion
a judge who took it on himself to phone someone he knew in the town where
a strike had occurred to supply missing evidence of picket-line misconduct;
18 'Tort Liability for Strikes in Canada: Some Problems of Judicial Workmanship'
(1960) 38 Cnd. Bar Rev. 346. I was not surprised to discover recently that Laskin's
first published article, also written when he was a student at Harvard, 'Picketing: A
comparison of certain Canadian and American Doctrines' (1937) 15 Cnd. Bar Rev.
10, referred frequently to The Labor Injunction, as did his second, 'The Labour
Injunction in Canada: A Caveat' (1937) 15 Cnd. Bar Rev. 270.
19 My mentor, Sydney Robins, a Harvard graduate, taught part-time at Osgoode Hall
Law School and was a brilliant litigator; he later became Treasurer of the Law Society
of Upper Canada and a Judge of the Ontario Court of Appeal.
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and on another, management counsel who assured me over lunch that on the
basis of the facts alleged in the menu, he would have no difficulty in securing
a labour injunction.
My exposure to the real world of labour injunctions, coupled with my
academic interest in the field, led me to invest the better part of a decade in a
campaign against their substantive deficiencies and procedural abuses.
20
Early on, I wrote a law review case-note (commented upon in a daily
newspaper) which earned me a letter from a judge demanding an apology -
surely an over-reaction on his part to my understated description of his
judgment as 'an affirmation of totalitarian philosophy quite inconsistent with
constitutional government . 1 A few years later, I proposed that union
members and supporters should not be found in contempt of an injunction for
publicly demanding the reform of injunction procedures; this earned me a
motion of censure at a Bar Association meeting which, alas, failed.
I survived these rites de passage, however, and ultimately graduated from
youthful attempts to exorcise the industrial torts and the labour injunction to
a more general campaign against any role whatsoever for courts in industrial
relations - either original or reviewing. This was a position which Laskin
himself may somewhat have favoured, though Frankfurter and Greene
probably did not. It was, however, more or less the ruin of me as a labour
lawyer. And things got worse: unable or unwilling to revise my initial
conclusions about labour law, I took to wondering out loud whether courts
had any role to play in any field involving social conflict or controversy.
2 2
And worse yet: I began to imagine a revised map of public law in which the
courts might either be sketched in at the margins or omitted altogether.23
And then things began to get better: I realized that I had to ask myself just
what was at the centre of my map if the courts were not, or whether indeed
there was a centre at all. 24 This proved to be the making of me as an
academic. Attempts to answer that question took me in the direction of legal
20 The copy of The Labor Injunction I used to write this article was acquired by the Law
Society's library in 1962; it was purchased at my request.
21 H. Arthurs, 'Labour Law - Secondary Picketing - Per Se Illegality - Public Policy'
(1963) 41 Cnd. Bar Rev. 573 at 58. Ironically, I was commenting on the first decision
by the in Ontario Court of Appeal concerning strikes and picketing to be handed
down since 1936, when the Court produced the decision which provoked Laskin's
first published article, op. cit., n. 18. One of the abuses of the labour injunction, as this
twenty-seven-year interval demonstrated, was the virtual impossibility of appealing
such injunctions, and hence of correcting errors in courts of first instance or even
reconciling divergent views amongst trial judges.
22 John Willis, Canada's most original public law scholar, once told me that judges
ought to think of themselves as 'civil servants in the Department of Dispute
Resolution' - an elegant and economical statement of my own position, but of course
entirely at odds with future developments in public law in Canada and elsewhere.
23 'Rethinking Administrative Law: A Slightly Dicey Business' (1979) 17 Osgoode Hall
LawJ. 1.
24 'Without the Law': Administrative Justice and Legal Pluralism in Nineteenth Century
England (1985).
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pluralism, a bundle of socio-legal theories which suggest that law can not
only exist without courts but without the state as well. Twenty years on, I am
still at it.
25
And what of the labour injunction? In theory, it is alive and well in most,
if not all, Canadian jurisdictions. However, as a practical matter, its use has
diminished considerably. Canadian studies documented abuses similar to
those found by Frankfurter and Greene.26 A federal Task Force on Labour
Relations recommended that labour relations boards should take over the
courts' remedial jurisdiction over the 'where', the 'why', and the 'when' of
picketing, leaving judges to deal only with the 'how' - with the deliberate
infliction of damage on persons or property.2 7 These recommendations were
adopted holus bolus in the innovative Labour Code of British Columbia,
28
and to a lesser extent in other provinces. Then, in the late 1970s, the Supreme
Court of Canada began to show somewhat greater deference to the normative
rules and remedial jurisdiction of labour tribunals, 29 while trial judges began
to exercise more self-restraint in issuing labour injunctions. Canadian
legislators reinforced these trends by adopting a series of reforms, which
varied from province to province, but in general either ensured greater
procedural fairness or, in some cases, abolished the industrial torts or
required that administrative or criminal remedies be exhausted before
injunctive relief could be sought.
A happy ending to the injunction story, more or less, and to my academic
career - all thanks to Frankfurter and Greene, and to Laskin too who first
introduced me to The Labour Injunction.
25 'Labour Law without the State?' (1996) 46 University Toronto Law J. 1;
'"Landscape and Memory": Labour Law, Legal Pluralism and Globalization' in
Advancing Theory in Labour Law in a Global Context, T. Wilthagen (ed.) (1997) 21;
'Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the Global Economy: Corporate Codes of
Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market Regulation' in Labour Law in an Era of
Globalization: Transformative Practices and Possibilities, eds. J. Conaghan, K.Klare,
and M. Fischl (2001).
26 A.W.R. Carrothers, The Labour Injunction in British Columbia (1956) and The
Labour Injunction (1961); A.W.R. Carrothers and E. Palmer, Report of a study on the
labour injunction in Ontario (1966); I. Christie, The Liability of Strikers in the Law of
Tort (1967); S. Tacon, Tort liability in a collective bargaining regime (1980).
27 Task Force on Labour Relations (H.D. Woods, Chair) (1968), at 177-87.
28 H. Arthurs, '"The Dullest Bill": Reflections on the Labour Code of British
Columbia' (1974) 9 University of British Columbia Law Rev. 280.
29 This development had several strands: judicial review of labour tribunals became
more circumspect, Canadian Union of Public Employees v. New Brunswick Liquor
Commission [1979] 2 SCR 227; courts refused to issue labour injunctions in situations
where comparable relief could be obtained from a labour tribunal, St Anne Nackawic
Pulp and Paper Co. v. Canadian Paper Workers Union [1986] 1 SCR 704; and some
of the most egregious labour torts were laid to rest, Retail, Wholesale and Department
Store Union, Local 558 v. Pepsi-Cola Canada Beverages (West) Ltd., (2002) 208
D.L.R. (4th) 385 (SCC).
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